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Abstract
Parikh and Krasucki [1990] showed that pairwise communication of the value of a
function f leads to a consensus about the communicated value if the function f is convex.
They showed that union consistency of f may not be sufficient to guarantee consensus in
any communication protocol. Krasucki [1996] proved that consensus occurs for any union
consistent function if the protocol contains no cycle. We show that if agents communi-
cate their optimal action, namely the action that maximizes their expected utility, then
consensus obtains in any fair protocol for any action space.
JEL Classification: D82.
Keywords: Consensus, Common knowledge, Pairwise Communication.
1 Introduction
Aumann [1976] proved that if two individuals have the same prior beliefs, then com-
mon knowledge of their posterior beliefs for an event implies the equality of these posteriors.
Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [1982] extended Aumann’s result to a dynamic framework,
and showed that communication of posterior beliefs leads to a situation of common knowledge
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of these posteriors. Cave [1983] and Bacharach [1985] proved these agreement results consid-
ering union consistent1 functions more general than posterior beliefs. In all of these settings,
communication is public, as achieved e.g. by auctions. Parikh and Krasucki [1990] investi-
gated the case where communication is not public but in pairs. They defined an updating
process along which agents communicate with each other, according to a protocol upon which
they have agreed beforehand. At each stage one of the agents transmits to another agent the
value of a certain function f , which depends on the set of states of the world she conceives
as possible at that stage. Parikh and Krasucki [1990] showed that two conditions guarantee
that eventually, all agents will communicate the same value (a situation we will refer to as
a consensus): 1) a fairness condition on the communication protocol, which imposes that
every agent has to be sender and receiver of the communication infinitely many times; 2) a
convexity condition on the function whose value is communicated. Let Ω be the set of states
of the world. A function f : 2Ω → R is convex if ∀ X,Y ∈ 2Ω such that X ∩ Y = ∅, there
exists α ∈]0, 1[ such that f(X ∪ Y ) = αf(X) + (1 − α)f(Y ). This condition is satisfied by
conditional probabilities for instance, and is more restrictive than Cave’s union consistency.
Parikh and Krasucki’s convexity condition may not apply in some contexts, as shown in
the following example. An individual contemplates buying a car. The set of available decisions
is {buy, not buy}. Suppose that we re-label the decisions in R, with for instance 1 standing
for buy and 0 standing for not buy. The convexity condition implies that if f(X) = 0 and
f(Y ) = 1 for some X,Y such that X ∩ Y = ∅, then f(X ∪ Y ) ∈ ]0, 1[, which does not
correspond to any decision in {buy,not buy}. Hence there are some decision spaces for which,
even after a re-labelling in R, we may not be able to apply the convexity condition.
Parikh and Krasucki [1990] showed by a counter-example that weak convexity2 and union
consistency are not sufficient to guarantee that consensus occurs in any fair protocol. Krasucki
[1996] investigated what restrictions on the communication protocol should be imposed to
guarantee the consensus with any union consistent function. He showed that if the protocol is
fair and contains no cycle, then communication of the value of any union consistent function
leads to consensus.
1Let Ω be the set of states of the world. f : 2Ω → D is union consistent if ∀ X,Y ∈ 2Ω such that X ∩Y = ∅,
f(X) = f(Y )⇒ f(X ∪ Y ) = f(X) = f(Y ).
2Let Ω be the set of states of the world. f : 2Ω → R is weakly convex if ∀ X,Y ∈ 2Ω such that X ∩ Y = ∅,
there exists α ∈ [0, 1] such that f(X ∪ Y ) = αf(X) + (1− α)f(Y ).
2
In this note, we give a new condition on f for consensus to emerge in any fair commu-
nication protocol. This condition is that the function whose values are communicated is the
maximizer of a conditional expected utility. Contrary to Parikh and Krasucki’s convexity
condition, this condition applies to any action space.
Even after an appropriate re-labelling of the image of f in R, the functions we consider
may not be representable by weakly convex functions. Furthermore, there exist weakly convex
functions that do not obey our condition. Hence the class of functions we look at have a non-
empty intersection with the class of weakly convex functions, but there is no inclusion relation
among them. On the other hand, for any decision space, the functions we consider are union
consistent.
2 Reaching a consensus
Let Ω be a finite set of states of the world. We consider a group of N agents, each of
them endowed with a partition Πi of Ω. All agents share some prior belief P on Ω. We
note Πi(ω) the cell of Πi that contains ω. Πi(ω) is the set of states that i judges possible
when state ω occurs. As in Parikh and Krasucki [1990], agents communicate the value of
a function f : 2Ω → D, according to a fair protocol Pr. A protocol is a pair of functions
(s(.), r(.)) : N → {1, . . . , N}2 where s(t) stands for the sender and r(t) the receiver of the
communication which takes place at time t. A protocol is fair3 if no participant is blocked
from the communication, that is if every agent is a sender and a receiver infinitely many times,
and everyone receives information from every other, possibly indirectly, infinitely many times.
Except fairness, we do not make any assumption on the protocol. We assume that D can be
any compact subset of a topological space.
Agents share a common payoff function U : D × Ω → R, which depends on the chosen
action d ∈ D and on the realized state of the world. We assume that U(., ω) is continuous on D
for all ω. What is communicated by an agent is the action that maximizes her expected utility,
computed with respect to the common belief P . In order to avoid indifference cases, we make
the assumption that given any event, all actions have different expected utility conditional on
3Given a protocol (s(t), r(t)) consider the directed graph whose vertices are the participants {1, . . . , N} and
such that there is an edge from i to j iff there are infinitely many t such that s(t) = i and r(t) = j. The
protocol is fair if the graph above is strongly connected.
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this event. That is to say given an event F ⊆ Ω, ∀ d, d′ ∈ D, E(U(d, .) | F ) 6= E(U(d′, .) | F ).
Without this assumption, the set of maximizing actions of an agent may not be a singleton,
and we would have to specify the way agents choose between indifferent actions.
The function f : 2Ω → D is then defined by:
∀ E ⊆ Ω, f(E) = argmaxd∈DE(U(d, .) | E)
Suppose now that Pr is some given protocol. The set of possible states for an agent i at
time t if the state of the world is ω is denoted Ci(ω, t) and is defined by the following recursive
process:
Ci(ω, 0) = Πi(ω)
Ci(ω, t+ 1) = Ci(ω, t) ∩ {ω′ ∈ Ω | f(Cs(t)(ω′, t)) = f(Cs(t)(ω, t))} if i = r(t),
Ci(ω, t+ 1) = Ci(ω, t) otherwise.
The next result states that for all ω, f(Ci(ω, t)) has a limiting value which does not depend
on i.
Theorem 1 There is a T ∈ N such that for all ω, i, and all t, t′ ≥ T , Ci(ω, t) = Ci(ω, t′).
Moreover, if the protocol is fair, then for all i, j, for all ω, f(Ci(ω, T )) = f(Cj(ω, T )).
We now discuss the properties of the function f defined as the argmax of an expected
utility. First, f is clearly union consistent for any action space. Second, f may not be
representable by a weakly convex function, namely a one to one function g : D → R may fail
to exist such that g ◦ f is weakly convex. If such a function g were to exist, learning and
consensus properties of f and g ◦f would be the same. Therefore, the functions f we consider
would be particular weakly convex functions, for which consensus obtains in any fair protocol.
We show that it is not the case with the following counter example.
Consider the case where Ω = {1, 2, 3, 4}, D = {a, b, c}, P is uniform (P (ω) = 1/4 ∀ ω) and
the utility function U is defined by:
U(a, 1) = 1, U(a, 2) = 0, U(a, 3) = 1, U(a, 4) = 0
U(b, 1) = 0, U(b, 2) = 1, U(b, 3) = 2/3, U(b, 4) = 2/3
U(c, 1) = 2/3, U(c, 2) = 2/3, U(c, 3) = 0, U(c, 4) = 1
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We have in particular:
f({1}) = a, f({2}) = b, f({3}) = a, f({4}) = c, f({1, 2}) = c, f({3, 4}) = b
For any one to one function g : D → R, six cases are possible. We show that in each case,
g ◦ f is not weakly convex.
1. If g(a) < g(b) < g(c), then g ◦ f({1}) < g ◦ f({2}) < g ◦ f({1, 2}).
2. If g(a) < g(c) < g(b), then g ◦ f({3}) < g ◦ f({4}) < g ◦ f({3, 4}).
3. If g(b) < g(a) < g(c), then g ◦ f({3, 4}) < g ◦ f({3}) < g ◦ f({4}).
4. If g(b) < g(c) < g(a), then g ◦ f({3, 4}) < g ◦ f({4}) < g ◦ f({3}).
5. If g(c) < g(a) < g(b), then g ◦ f({1, 2}) < g ◦ f({1}) < g ◦ f({2}).
6. If g(c) < g(b) < g(a), then g ◦ f({1, 2}) < g ◦ f({2}) < g ◦ f({1}).
Finally, there exist weakly convex functions that cannot be defined as the argmax of an
expected utility. Such an example can be found in Parikh and Krasucki [1990, p 185]: they
exhibit a weakly convex function f such that consensus may fail to occur in some protocols.
It can be shown easily that it is not possible to find a utility function U and a probability P
such that this function f is the argmax of the conditional expectation of U .
References
[1] Aumann R. J., [1976], Agreeing to Disagree, The Annals Of Statistics, 4, 1236-1239.
[2] Bacharach M., [1985], Some Extensions of a Claim of Aumann in an Axiomatic Model of
Knowledge, Journal of Economic Theory, 37, 167-190.
[3] Cave J., [1983], Learning To Agree, Economics Letters, 12, 147-152.
[4] Geanakoplos J., Polemarchakis H., [1982], We Can’t Disagree Forever, Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 28, 192-200.
[5] Krasucki P., [1996], Protocols Forcing Consensus, Journal of Economic Theory, 70, 266-
272.
5
[6] Parikh R., Krasucki P., [1990], Communication, Consensus and Knowledge, Journal of
Economic Theory, 52, 178-189.
Proof: [Theorem 1]
1) As Ω is finite, the first part of the theorem is evident. In the sequel, we will note Ci(ω) the
limiting value of Ci(ω, t), and Ci the information partition of agent t at equilibrium.
2) As in Parikh and Krasucki [1990], we prove the second part of the theorem for N = 3 and
for a “round-robin protocol”, namely such that for all t, s(t) = t mod 3 and r(t) = (t + 1)
mod 3. Note that this is sufficient to prove the theorem for any fair protocol. Our argument
only uses the fact that we are able to find a chain t1 < t2 < · · · < tp, with T ≤ t1, such
that: (a) s(t1) = 1, (b) the receiver at tj is the sender at tj+1, (c) the chain passes through
all participants, finally returning to 1. This is implied by the fact that the protocol is fair.
Let Mij be the partition of common knowledge among agents i and j at equilibrium, that
is Mij is the finest partition of Ω such that ∀ ω, Ci(ω) ⊆ Mij(ω) and Cj(ω) ⊆ Mij(ω). By
consequence, ∀ ω, Mij(ω) is a disjoint union of cells of Ci and a disjoint union of cells of Cj .∑
Ci(k)⊆Mij(ω) will denote the sum on all cells of Ci composing Mij(ω).
At equilibrium, agent 1 communicates her optimal action to agent 2, agent 2 communicates
her optimal action to agent 3 and agent 3 communicates her optimal action to agent 1. By
consequence, the action taken by agent 1 is common knowledge among 1 and 2. Hence we
have for all ω:
M12(ω) ⊆ {ω′ ∈ Ω | f(C1(ω′)) = f(C1(ω))}
AsM12(ω) is a disjoint union of cells of C1, union consistency of f implies that f(M12(ω)) = f(C1(k))
∀ k ∈M12(ω).
• Result 1 E(U(f(M12(ω)), .) |M12(ω)) = E[E(U(f(C1(¦)), .) | C1(¦)) |M12(ω)]
Proof : For all ω′ ∈M12(ω), f(C1(ω′)) = f(M12(ω)). ThenE[E(U(f(C1(¦)), .) | C1(¦)) |M12(ω)] =
E[E(U(f(M12(ω)), .) | C1(¦)) |M12(ω)]. As M12 is coarser than C1, the law of iterated expec-
tations implies that E[E(U(f(M12(ω)), .) | C1(¦)) |M12(ω)] = E(U(f(M12(ω)), .) |M12(ω)].
• Result 2 E(U(f(M12(ω)), .) |M12(ω)) ≤
∑
C2(k)⊆M12(ω)
P (C2(k))
P (M12(ω))
E(U(f(C2(k)), .) | C2(k))
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Proof : By definition, ∀ k ∈M12(ω) we have:
E(U(f(M12(ω)), .) | C2(k)) ≤ E(U(f(C2(k)), .) | C2(k))
It implies that:∑
C2(k)⊆M12(ω)
P (C2(k))E(U(f(M12(ω)), .) | C2(k)) ≤
∑
C2(k)⊆M12(ω)
P (C2(k))E(U(f(C2(k)), .) | C2(k))
that is:
P (M12(ω))E(U(f(M12(ω)), .) |M12(ω)) ≤
∑
C2(k)⊆M12(ω)
P (C2(k))E(U(f(C2(k)), .) | C2(k))¤
• Result 3 ∀ i, j, E[E(U(f(Ci(¦)), .) | Ci(¦))] = E[E(U(f(Cj(¦)), .) | Cj(¦))]
Proof :
E[E(U(f(C1(¦)), .) | C1(¦))] =
∑
M12(ω)⊆Ω
P (M12(ω)E[E(U(f(C1(¦)), .) | C1(¦)) |M12(ω)]
Yet by results 1 and 2, we have
P (M12(ω))E[E(U(f(C1(¦)), .) | C1(¦)) |M12(ω)] ≤
∑
C2(k)⊆M12(ω)
P (C2(k))E(U(f(C2(k)), .) | C2(k))
Then
E[E(U(f(C1(¦)), .) | C1(¦))] ≤
∑
M12(ω)⊆Ω
∑
C2(k)⊆M12(ω)
P (C2(k))E(U(f(C2(k)), .) | C2(k))
=
∑
C2(k)⊆Ω
P (C2(k))E(U(f(C2(k)), .) | C2(k))
= E[E(U(f(C2(¦)), .) | C2(¦))]
Applying the same reasoning, we get
E[E(U(f(C2(¦)), .) | C2(¦))] ≤ E[E(U(f(C3(¦)), .) | C3(¦))]
and
E[E(U(f(C3(¦)), .) | C3(¦))] ≤ E[E(U(f(C1(¦)), .) | C1(¦))]
Hence E[E(U(f(Ci(¦)), .) | Ci(¦))] = E[E(U(f(Cj(¦)), .) | Cj(¦))] for all i, j. ¤
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• Result 4 For all ω ∈ Ω, we have
E(U(f(C1(ω)), .) | C2(ω)) = E(U(f(C2(ω)), .) | C2(ω))
E(U(f(C2(ω)), .) | C3(ω)) = E(U(f(C3(ω)), .) | C3(ω))
E(U(f(C3(ω)), .) | C1(ω)) = E(U(f(C1(ω)), .) | C1(ω))
Proof :
By Result 3, the inequality can not be strict in Result 2. Then we have:
P (M12(ω))E(U(f(M12(ω)), .) |M12(ω)) =
∑
C2(k)⊆M12(ω)
P (C2(k))E(U(f(C2(k)), .) | C2(k))
By definition, E(U(f(C1(k)), .) | C2(k)) ≤ E(U(f(C2(k)), .) | C2(k)) for all k ∈M12(ω).
If ∃ k such that E(U(f(C1(k)), .) | C2(k)) < E(U(f(C2(k)), .) | C2(k)), then∑
C2(k)⊆M12(ω)
P (C2(k))E(U(f(C1(k)), .) | C2(k)) <
∑
C2(k)⊆M12(ω)
P (C2(k)E(U(f(C2(k)), .) | C2(k))
that is:
P (M12(ω))E(U(f(M12(ω)), .) |M12(ω)) <
∑
C2(k)⊆M12(ω)
P (C2(k)E(U(f(C2(k)), .) | C2(k))
which is a contradiction.
Hence we have E(U(f(C1(k)), .) | C2(k)) = E(U(f(C2(k)), .) | C2(k)) for all k ∈ M12(ω). As
it is true for all ω, we have E(U(f(C1(k)), .) | C2(k)) = E(U(f(C2(k)), .) | C2(k)) for all k ∈ Ω.
The same reasoning applies for 2, 3 and 3, 1. ¤
From Result 4 and the assumption that all actions bring different expected utilities, we
have
f(C1(ω)) = f(C2(ω)) = f(C3(ω)) ∀ ω ∈ Ω
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